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GENDER DISPARITIES IN PRIMARY EDUCATION ACROSS SIBLINGS 
IS INTRA HOUSEHOLD DISPARITY HIGHER IN REGIONS WITH LOW 
CHILD SEX RATIOS? 
 
The strong son preference observed in South Asian countries has led to practices like sex 
selective abortion and infanticide (either directly, or through neglect). This has led to a 
decline in child sex ratio. In India, for instance, the number of females per 1000 males (in 
the age group 0-6 years) has fallen to from 927 (2001 Census) to 914 girls per 1000 boys 
(2011 Census). This has been referred to as the phenomenon of “missing girls” (Sen, 
1992, 2003). The term “missing girls” is defined as the difference between number of 
women there would be without female disadvantage in survival and actual number of 
women. Economists have argued that this deficit was mainly caused by sex selective 
abortion and neglect of the girl child during her early years (Qian and Lin, 2002; Sahni et 
al., 2008). Sen (1992) estimated that as many as 23 million women were “missing” in 
India.1 Recent studies have also provided evidence of the role of sex-selective abortion 
and infanticide in sex imbalances (Sahni et al., 2008), particularly among urban educated 
households (Nanda and Véron, 2005). 
 
An interesting question that emerges in this context is whether such attitudes persist, 
leading to discrimination in spheres like primary education. This is important in view of 
the empowering effects of education and the wide gender disparity in primary educational 
attainments observed in many countries. In West and Central Africa, for instance, 
                                               
1 Oster (2005), however, argues that the high incidence of Hepatitis B among parents, coupled with the 
skewed male-female birth (1.5:1) given by carriers, explains this phenomenon. She argued that this 
explanation accounted for 45 per cent of the missing women in the world, and about a fifth in India (Oster, 
2005). Oster’s theory was criticized by Dasgupta (2006); it was also pointed out by Lin and Luoh (2008) 
that Hepatitis B could account for only 1-2 per cent of missing women in China. 
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primary completion rates (PCRs)2 boys are 15 percentage points above that of girls (UIS, 
2005). The 2001 Census revealed that the PCR in India was 51 per cent, with a gender 
gap of 21 percentage points. Although the gender gap is particularly high in rural areas 
(25 percentage points), urban disparity levels, too, are quite high (16 percentage points). 
The Annual Survey Education Reports brought out by PRATHAM3 also reveal that 
gender disparities at the primary education remains a major issue for policy making in 
India. 
 
Given that education has a significant spillover effects not only on the present generation 
but also in the future, with mothers playing an important role in the education of children 
(Hadden and London, 1996), the wide gender gap observed in developing countries and 
in India has serious implications for economic growth and human development. 
Therefore, the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) has also acknowledged the need 
to promote gender equality in primary and secondary schooling and women 
empowerment (Goal 3).  
 
Attaining such a goal will not be easy, particularly in view of the fiscal squeeze on the 
education budget in developing countries, gender insensitive nature of existing policies 
(Lockheed, 2010) and disincentives to educating girls (Hannum et al., 2008; PROBE, 
1999; Sathar and Lloyd, 1994). In order to introduce an effective strategy to ensure 
                                               
2 The primary completion rate is the ratio of the total number of students successfully completing (or 
graduating from) the last year of primary school in a given year to the total number of children of official 
graduation age in the population. (United Nation Development Group, 2003). 
3 Since 2005, PRATHAM, an Indian NGO, has bringing out annual reports on the access to education and 
its quality. These reports are available at http://www.asercentre.org/ngo-education-
india.php?p=Download+ASER+reports.  
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gender equality it is necessary to identify the forces that influence gender disparities in 
education. Further, given that such disparities essentially occur as a result of household 
decision-making, such an analysis must occur at the household level. The literature on 
gender disparities in education has focused on the individual level. Such studies, relying 
mainly on econometric methods, have established that gender disparities exist (for the 
mean household). In comparison, the literature on intra-household disparity between 
siblings of opposite gender is rare, particularly in the context of the Indian economy. 
 
This study attempts to remedy this lacuna by directly comparing educational outcomes of 
siblings from the same family. Focusing on households with both sons and daughters, we 
have developed two simple measures of gender disparity in education within such 
households. We will then examine how these intra-household disparity measures vary 
across household characteristics, to enable us to identify the determinants of gender 
disparity at the primary education level. Specifically, we will test the hypothesis that 
households in regions with low child sex ratio will educate sons more than daughters.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows: In the next section we review the existing 
methodologies to measure gender disparity and identify its limitations with respect to our 
research question. This is followed by a description of our methodology – how we 
adapted the National Sample Survey (NSS) data set to facilitate comparisons between 
siblings - and the measures of disparity employed in the study. The next two sections 
present the findings of our analysis, while a concluding section sums up the main 
findings and uses them to draw policy conclusions. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Limitations of existing methodology 
While researchers often theorize that differential treatments by parents, based on the 
gender of their children, play a role in the considerable differences in educational 
outcomes observed in developing countries, attempts to directly examine whether 
educational outcomes of siblings from the same family vary are rare (Gregory, 2010). 
The majority of researchers estimate regression models using individual level data, to 
identify factors like family income or wealth, parental education, empowerment and 
education of mother, credit constraints, age and gender of the child, family size or 
presence of siblings, caste affiliations, religious identity, place of residence and 
educational infrastructure as determinants of educational outcomes (Boissiere, 2004; 
Brown and Park, 2002; Connelly and Zheng, 2003; Deolalikar, 1993; Desai and Kulkarni, 
2005; Dreze and Kingdon, 2001). The common method of testing for the presence of 
gender disparity is to estimate the regression equation: 
  Y = α + β MALE + δ Control Variables   [1] 
when: 
Y = Probability of attaining a specific educational stage (like enrolment, primary 
education, etc.) 
MALE = 1 if respondent is male = 0 if respondent is female 
Control variables include income (or expenditure), household size, age of 
respondent, place of residence, geographical region, occupation of parents, etc. 
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A statistically significant and positive coefficient of the gender dummy (MALE) 
indicates that male children enjoy a relative advantage over female children. 
 
This method enables us to test for the presence and direction of gender disparity by 
measuring the magnitude of disparity in a representative household (characterized by 
mean values of control variables). However, an important question that researchers and 
policy makers face is how the level of disparity varies across different groups. This can 
be examined in two ways – either by re-estimating the equation for sub-groups of the 
original sample (as for instance in Irving and Kingdon, 2008), or by introducing 
interaction dummies (Sen et al., 2007). However, both methods have their limitations. 
 
The former method is to re-estimate [1] for groups of the original sample, and see how 
the coefficient of the gender dummy is changing across sub-samples. For instance, [1] 
may be estimated for rural residents and urban residents separately to see whether gender 
disparity is greater in rural areas. However, this method is cumbersome and does not 
offer any direct test of significant variation in regression coefficients across the sub-
samples. The use of interaction dummies, on the other hand, is more effective, 
particularly if we want to examine the variation in gender disparity over one or two 
dimensions.  
 
Interaction dummies involve adding an additional variable to see whether disparity varies 
across a particular control variable or not. For instance, we can add MALE*URBAN (=1 
if respondent is male and resides in urban areas) to [1]. The t-statistic and sign of this 
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variable indicates whether boys are indeed better off than girls to a greater extent in 
urban areas. The problem with introducing interaction dummies is that it is not viable to 
incorporate too many interaction dummies. It is difficult to interpret the estimated 
regression coefficients; in addition the issue of collinearity may result in the dropping of 
some of the dummies.  
 
Another approach to measuring discrimination is based on the Oaxaca decomposition 
method (Oaxaca, 1973). This method argues that if we have a function: 
Y = α + β X 
the difference in outcomes between two groups (labeled for convenience as Superior and 
Inferior) may be attributed in part to the differences in X (that is, difference in XS and XI) 
and in part to the differences in slope coefficients (that is, difference in βS and βI). Thus: 
  YS - YI = βI(XS - XI) + XS(βS - βI) 
= βS(XS - XI) + XI(βS - βI)   [2] 
The two decompositions are similar conceptually, but vary with respect to the reference 
category being used. The second component in both formulations is the residual 
component, taken to represent an estimation of the extent of discrimination. Although this 
decomposition was initially formulated for continuous outcomes, it has been 
subsequently adapted for non-linear models also (Fairlie, 2005; Mathew et al. 2008).  
 
The method was initially used to measure discrimination in labour market outcomes, but 
has also been applied in research on health and education. Kingdon (2001), for instance, 
has used this method to estimate the gender gap in education. Based on data collected 
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from a household-level survey in urban Uttar Pradesh, carried out in 1995, Kingdon 
found that parental motivation to educate girls was significantly lower, relative to the 
motivation to educate boys – indicated by the presence of a large unexplained component 
in the gender gap in schooling attainment. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method is 
useful if we propose to estimate the extent of discrimination. However, it has two 
limitations. Firstly, the magnitude of the residual will depend upon the explanatory 
variables being used in the model. Thus, omission of an important determinant of 
educational attainment will result in an increase in residual component. The second 
limitation of this method is that it only provides an estimate of the magnitude of 
discrimination; it fails to identify the factors determining the level of discrimination.  
 
In contrast to such studies, studies of disparities in educational outcomes across siblings 
are not only allows us to concentrate directly on gender disparity and identify its 
determinants, but is also justifiable on conceptual grounds. As pointed out by Sen and 
Batliawala (2000) disparity occurs at the household/family level, so that it would be more 
appropriate to study intra-household disparity between siblings in each household – 
rather than between children across households (when using individual level data). This 
approach is also consistent with both the new family economics (Agarwal, 1994; Sen, 
1990) that argues us to look at intra-household distribution of resources (for education) 
and with the conceptualization of schooling demand as a household level analysis (Dreze 
and Kingdon, 2001).  
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Unfortunately, such studies are rare. Possibly the first study of disparity in educational 
outcome was by Behrman et al. (1995), in the context of the US economy. A recent study 
by Eirich (2010) employs a fixed effects regression model to show that parents in US do 
prefer sons. Further, while marked levels of disparity may be observed among families 
from affluent socio-economic status, households with low socio-economic status do not 
seem to discriminate between siblings. A study based on Ethopian Rural Household 
Survey (1994-2004), too, found evidence of discrimination against daughters (Delelegn, 
2007). Another interesting study by Chen et al. (2009) tests whether son preference leads 
to gender disparities in educational outcomes between siblings in Taiwan. Interestingly, 
they observe positive spillovers from having a brother (in the form of increased parenting 
time by mothers and increased supply of working hours by fathers) positively affecting 
educational outcome of girls. A study of rural Chinese families also found that parents, 
despite expecting to rely on sons for old-age support and agreeing that sending girls to 
school was useless since they would get married and leave home, did not discriminate 
significantly between sons and daughters (Hannum et al., 2008). However, there does not 
seem to be any major study of intra-household discrimination against girls in India, a 
country where the issue of missing women is a major problem. The present study is an 
attempt to address this deficiency. 
 
Database and how it is adapted 
The paper is based on unit level data pertaining to Schedule 10.1 from the 61st round of 
the National Survey Organization (NSSO) survey on “Employment and unemployment 
situation in India” undertaken between July 2004 and June 2005. Data was collected from 
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124,680 randomly selected households (79,306 in rural areas and 45,374 in urban areas) 
containing 602,833 individuals (398,025 in rural areas and 204,808 in urban areas). A 
multi stage sampling design was adopted for the survey.  
 
While the dataset contains information pertaining to both households and individuals 
surveyed, we extracted the individual-level information relating to age, sex and 
educational attainments (provided in Block 4 of the questionnaire). We then recoded 
information on educational levels of respondents as follows: 
 Illiterates were given a  score of 1,  
 Literates without formal education were scored as 2,  
 Drop-outs before completing primary education were scored as 3, and  
 All respondents completing at least primary education were allotted a score of 4. 
It may be argued that this system of assigning values to educational levels is arbitrary, 
particularly as the values are ordinal in nature. While admitting the merit of this criticism 
we would like to point out that the available database does not permit us to assign 
cardinal values to educational levels. This would be possible if, for instance, we had 
information on years of schooling of respondents. Despite the crudity of our measure, 
however, we feel that it does raise some interesting issues, which can be explored using 
more accurate measures of educational attainment.  
 
Using the collapse command in STATA, we next calculated the number of girls and boys 
aged 12-18 years for each household and the average educational score for such boys and 
girls in each household. This information – relating to each household – was stored in a 
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household level file, which was then merged with other files containing the relevant 
household level information on socio-economic characteristics of each family (from 
Blocks 1 and 3).  
 
Finally, the gap between the average educational attainments of boys and girls was used 
to obtain a distance-based measure of gender inequality in educational attainments. In 
addition, we also estimated the gap between maximum educational score attained by any 
boy and any girl in the household. Thus, we have two measures of gender deprivation: 
D1i = AESbi - AESgi   [2] 
D2i = MESbi - MESgi   [3] 
when, 
AESbi: Average educational score for boys in household i  
AESgi: Average educational score for girls in household i 
MESbi: Maximum educational score attained by a boy in household i  
MESgi: Maximum educational score attained by a girl in household i 
 
Three points need to be clarified here.  
1. Households may be classified into four groups, based on the gender composition 
of their children – households may have only sons, only daughters, both sons and 
daughters and no children. The gender gap, or distance, is calculated only for 
households having siblings of both gender. There are 18,851 such households in 
the dataset. 
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2. The age limits of 12 and 18 have to be justified. The lower age limit is taken to 
ensure that children are allowed the opportunity of completing five years of 
schooling. The upper age limit was imposed to ensure that children remain in their 
parental household (and does not leave it either due to marriage, or to set up a 
new household after getting employment), so that the information that we obtain 
about the socio-economic characteristics of the respondent’s household 
(particularly, gender, education and occupation of the head of family, and 
monthly expenditure level) relates to their parental family. This prevents 
misspecification of the data set. 
3. The focus on primary education may be justified because of two reasons. Firstly, 
primary education is an important stage in education and has important 
consequences for growth and development. It provides the foundation, which can 
be used by individuals to access information at latter stages; it is also important in 
for functional purposes. Secondly, focusing on higher levels of education would 
have required raising lower age limits, resulting in the inclusion of a group of 
respondents who have left their parental families. 
 
Sample profile 
Before proceeding to the main analysis, it is necessary to understand the characteristics of 
the households whom we will be analyzing. In addition, we also want to check whether 
we have sufficient observations in the categories formed by the control variables to be 
used in our analysis. Analysis of the sample profile (Appendix Table A.1) indicates the 
following facts: 
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1. About 67 per cent of households reside in rural areas. 
2. About a third of the households are from Central Indian states. Representation from 
the remaining zones varies from 10 to 15 per cent of total sample. 
3. About 30 per cent of the households in India belong to Hindu-Other Cakward Castes 
(HOBC) community. Hindu Scheduled Castes (HSCs) comprise 15 per cent, Hindu 
Upper Castes (HUCs) 20 per cent and Hindu Scheduled Tribes (HSTs) 6 per cent of 
the sample households. About 16 per cent of the households belong to the Muslim 
community. 
4. About 22 per cent lie below the poverty line, while 53 per cent of households lie 
above the poverty line but below double the poverty line. 
5. The majority of households have male heads (91 per cent). 
6. Around 32 per cent of the household heads are illiterate; 25 per cent of household 
heads have completed primary level (4-5 years of schooling), while 25 per cent have 
studied up to the secondary level (10 years of schooling). Only 9 per cent completed 
higher secondary level (12 years of schooling). 
7. Analysis of the occupational pattern of the household head reveals that majority of 
the household heads are self-employed in agricultural sector (27 per cent). The next 
largest occupational groups are self employed in non-agricultural sector (16 per cent) 
and self employed in urban sector (15%). Wage and salary earners comprise 12 per 
cent of the sample households. 
 
EDUCATIONAL DISPARITY AND CHILD SEX RATIO 
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Let us first start by analyzing the frequency distribution of households according to their 
discrimination pattern. Although three possibilities may occur – households discriminate 
against girls, households treat both genders equally, and households discriminate against 
boys – we would expect a priori that the second and, particularly, the third category will 
not have a high frequency. Our analysis yields the surprising result that as many as 70 per 
cent of sample households educate both sons and daughters equally. Moreover, only 
about a fifth of the households discriminate against girls while one of every ten 
households actually educate daughters more than sons. In urban areas, the corresponding 
figures are 77, 13 and 11 per cent, respectively, indicating that gender disparity in 
educational attainments are lower in urban areas. If we consider differences in maximum 
educational score, we find an even lower level of disparity (households who do not 
discriminate comprise 75 and 83 per cent of households in rural and urban areas, 
respectively), while in only 17 and 9 percent of households discriminate against 
daughters.4 
 
Child sex ratio and discrimination in education 
To examine the validity of our hypothesis that discrimination patterns is related with 
child sex ratio we first estimate mean child sex ratio for the three categories of 
households – those favouring sons, those behaving equitably and those favouring 
daughters. If our hypothesis is true, then we would expect the mean child sex ratio be 
                                               
4 Now one possibility is that the educational levels of boys are very low, so that there is not much scope to 
practice discrimination. To check this, we analyzed the educational level of children in households where 
boys and girls are treated equally. We find that children in nine out of every ten of such households have 
completed at least five years of schooling. On the other hand, only 0.04 per cent of such households have 
not enrolled their children in schools.  
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lowest in the first category of households and lowest in the third group. Our estimates 
indicate otherwise (Table 1).  
Insert Table 1 
What we do observe is a U-shape relation, with the worst child sex ratio being observed 
in households treating both sons and daughters equitably. On the other hand, mean of 
child sex ratio is lowest for households favouring girls – in the Rural+Urban and Rural 
samples! This may be observed for both mean and maximum score (D1 and D2). This is 
surprising and calls for a closer look. Let us examine the data graphically. 
 
Disparity in mean educational attainments  
Using the unit level data from the 61st Round, we had calculated child sex ratio for each 
of the NSS regions. These are then clubbed into deciles, and the percentage of families 
who treat their children equitably (D1=0) and the percentage of families who favour sons 
(D1>0) are calculated for each of these deciles. These percentages are then plotted against 
each decile (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2). 
 
Insert Fig 1 
In Fig. 1 we have plotted the distribution of families who treat both sons and daughters 
equitably. While, a priori, we would expect that this proportion is low in the initial 
deciles, and rises in higher deciles (a positive slope), the opposite trend is observed. This 
holds for both Rural and Urban areas, as well as the combined sample. 
Insert Fig 2 
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In Fig. 2, where we have plotted the distribution of households who invest more on sons, 
a positive slope is observed, indicating that it is in regions where sex ratio is high that a 
greater proportion of families discriminate against daughters. 
 
Disparity in maximum educational attainments 
The analysis is repeated using D2 (disparity in maximum score). The trend is less clear 
this time for the distribution of families who educate children equally (Fig. 3), but the 
expected positive slope is clearly not visible. 
Insert Fig 3 
In Fig. 4, where distribution of families discriminating against girls is plotted, a positive 
trend is discernible. 
Insert Fig 4 
 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
The above analysis is based on descriptive statistics, and neither tests whether the 
variation across deciles is statistically significant nor controls for household and regional 
characteristics. This section attempts to redress this deficiency by estimating a regression 
model. The econometric model regresses D1 and D2 on child sex ratio of the region in 
which the household is located. In addition it includes three broad groups of control 
variables: 
 Household characteristics: Per capita monthly expenditure, Socio-religious 
identity, Gender of family head, Education of family head, Occupation of family 
head, Number of children aged 12-18 years, Geographical zone, Rural/Urban; 
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 Gender-related regional indicators: Female Workforce Participation Rates, 
Percentage of females who have completed primary education, Ratio of female 
and male daily wage rate;5 and, 
 Supply of educational facilities: No. of schools per ‘000 population, Percentage of 
schools without girls toilet, Percentage of schools with female teachers.6 
 
Choice of econometric model 
The dependent variables are D1 and D2 (household level disparity levels). Although both 
variables are continuous, the OLS method is not appropriate as there is a censoring 
problem within the measures of disparities adopted. Consider a household where the boy 
is educated up to primary level (score of 4) while the girl is not educated at all (score is 
0). In this case, D1 = 4 – 0 = 4. Compare this with another household, where the boy is 
educated up to (say) secondary level. Although disparity level is higher, D1 (and also D2) 
is same for both households. Thus, disparity levels higher than 4 (-4) are censored and 
observed as 4 (-4). While the Tobit model appears to be the relevant econometric model 
in this case, there is a problem with using this method also. The frequency distribution of 
D1 and D2 indicates presence of an unusually high spike (with over 70 per cent of 
observations) for D1 = D2 = 0. The resultant lack of matching between variation in the 
independent variables and the largely constant dependent variable may reduce the 
explanatory power of the estimated model. So the Tobit model, too, may not be 
appropriate for our dataset. 
 
                                               
5 These variables were calculated for NSS-regions from the NSS data set from Blocks 4 and 5.3. 
6 These were calculated for the district level from District Information System for Education (DISE) data 
pertaining to 2005, retrieved on 23 December 2010 from http://www.dise.in/drc.htm. 
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We have, therefore, categorized the dependent variables into three categories as follows: 
Households discriminating in favour of girls (D1= D2<0) 
Households who do not discriminate (D1= D2=0) 
Households discriminating in favour of boys (D1= D2>0) 
The response variable generates three precise categories. Further, as the variable has a 
natural (ordinal) ranking/ordering – higher the values of the dependent variable mean that 
household favour sons more – an ordered logit (McCullagh 1980) appears to be the 
appropriate model.7 Now the ordered logit model has three variants, depending upon its 
underlying variant: 
a) Proportional odds model: The ordered logit models fit a parallel slope model where 
the regression lines are parallel to each other – only the intercepts differ, 
corresponding to the outcomes.  
Now the assumption of constant gradient across the independent variables is a strong 
assumption. To test whether the slope coefficients may be assumed to be constant 
across the outcome categories Brant (1990) suggests a χ2 based test. If the null 
hypothesis of constant slope is rejected then the assumption of constant slopes has to 
be relaxed. In this situation, two alternative models may be chosen based upon a 
likelihood ratio test of nested models (Williams, 2006). 
b) Variable parameter model: This model goes to the other extreme of the proportional 
odds model by assuming that slopes of all variables vary with outcomes. 
c) Partial proportional odds model: Lying between these two extremes is the partial 
proportional odds model, where slopes of only selected models are allowed to vary, 
                                               
7 An ordered logit model is used in cases where the dependent variable (y) is continuous but unobserved. 
This latent variable is measured using an observed discrete variable (y*) which clubs together all values of 
y falling within certain ranges. This latent variable has another characteristic – it is ordinally ordered. 
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keeping slopes of other variables constant. The variables for which the proportional 
odds assumption is relaxed are chosen on the basis of the Brant test. 
 
4.1 Disparity in Mean Score (D1) 
The results of the Brant test (χ2= 2174.79, p=0.00) indicate that the proportional odds 
model is not valid; the value of the likelihood ratio statistic for testing nestedness of the 
partial odds model within the variable parameter model (χ2=11.71, p=0.4695) indicates 
that the former model is the most parsimonious form of the model. The results of this 
model are given in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 
The partial proportional odds model is estimated using log likelihood estimates with 
17866 no. of observations. The Wald χ2 is 7008.3 (p=0.00), indicating that the model as a 
whole fits significantly better than an empty model (model with β1 = β2 = β3 = … = βn = 
0). As the conventional measure of goodness of fit cannot be estimated, we use 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 (= 0.09). The low value of Pseudo R2 reflects the substantial 
heterogeneity within our sample. 
 
The odd ratio of Child Sex Ratio is statistically significant at 5 percent levels in both 
models. However, their signs vary – in case of the first model (Favour girls versus Equal 
treatment & favour boys), the coefficient is negative, while in the second model (Favour 
girls & equal treatment versus Favour boys), it is positive. This implies that families 
residing in areas where child sex ratio is low tend to be equitable, while those residing in 
areas with high child sex ratio tend to discriminate. What is important is that, although 
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families discriminate, such discrimination may be not only in favour of sons, but also 
daughters. 
 
Other important results of the model are as follows: 
1. Households with low per capita income or with large number of children are more 
likely to discriminate, though this discrimination can be in either direction. 
2. Analysis of the coefficients of socio-religious groups yields interesting results. 
HUC and HOBC families tend to be more equitable than Muslims. Comparison of 
Muslim parents with HSC and HST parents, however, reveals that the latter are 
more likely to discriminate against daughters. Behavior of All Others does not 
significantly differ from Muslims. 
3. Households residing in rural areas are more likely to favour sons than households 
residing in urban areas. 
4. Male headed households are more likely to favour sons than female headed 
households. 
5. Analysis of the behavioural differences across geographical zones is also 
interesting. Households residing in North and East India are less likely to favour 
sons than those residing in Central India. While South and West Indian families 
tend to treat children equitably, households in North-east Indian states8 are more 
likely to favour daughters than Central Indian families.  
6. While family heads without education or below primary education tend to educate 
sons more than daughters, those with secondary or higher levels of education tend 
to behave in a more equitable manner. 
                                               
8 The matriarchal system prevailing in North-eastern states is an important factor underlying this result. 
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7. Most of the occupational categories have coefficients statistically insignificant at 
10 per cent level. However agricultural labourers and rural non-farm labourers 
tend to discriminate in favour of sons more than those self-employed in 
agriculture. On the other hand, ‘Other rural labourers’, tend to favour daughters 
compared to those who are self-employed in agriculture. 
8. Coefficient of schools per ‘000 persons is insignificant at 10 per cent level. 
Parents residing in areas having schools with separate girls’ toilet and with female 
teachers are more likely to favour daughters. 
9. Kingdon and Theopold (2008) point out that economic return to education may 
have an ambigious impact on demand for schooling. Table 2 reveals that ratio of 
female to male daily wages motivates parents to discriminate in favour of sons. 
High female work force participation rate, on the other hand, does not lead to 
discrimination. 
10. Households residing in areas having high proportion of women with at least 
primary education tend to treat children equitably. 
 
4.2 Disparity in Maximum Score (D2) 
We next present the results of the ordered logit based on D2 (gap in maximum score). The 
results of the Brant test (χ2= 1448.76, p=0.00) and the likelihood test (χ2=10.05, 
p=0.5258) indicates that the partial odds model is the most appropriate model. Although 
the pseudo R2 is again very low (=0.09), the Wald χ2 is satisfactory (=1804.71; p=0.00). 
The results of this model are given in Table 3. 
Table 3 
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The coefficient of Child Sex Ratio is weakly significant (at 10 per cent level) only for the 
first model, having a negative coefficient. In the second model, it is insignificant. This 
would imply that families in regions having a high child sex ratio may tend to favour 
daughters.  
 
On the other hand, families with higher per capita income levels tend to invest equally on 
sons and daughters. A similar tendency is also observed among families with large 
number of children. Rural households families, however, tend to invest more on sons than 
daughters, compared to urban households. Households residing in northern and north-
eastern states educate daughters more than sons compared to central Indian households. 
In southern and western part of the country children are treated equally, relative to central 
Indian states. The behaviour of the eastern families is not significantly different from the 
behaviour of central Indian families. 
 
HUC and HOBC families treat sons and daughters equally compared to Muslims. HSC 
and HST parents, on the other hand, are less likely to discriminate against daughters than 
Muslims parents. The behaviour of the residual group (All Others) is not significantly 
different from the Muslims. 
 
Male headed households are more likely to favour sons over daughters compared to 
female headed households. Families headed by persons with less than primary education 
tend to discriminate against daughters, while those with education levels higher than 
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primary level treat children equitably. Results show that discrimination levels do not vary 
across occupation of household head. 
 
If the educational infrastructure is better (number of school per ‘000 persons) or is more 
sensitive to girls (per cent of schools with girls toilet and per cent of schools with female 
teacher) families tend to invest relatively more on daughters.  
 
A high female-male wage ratio motivates parents to withdraw daughters from school, 
possibly due to higher opportunity cost of educating them. Regions where a high 
proportion of females have completed primary education tend to treat sons and daughters 
equitably. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper examines gender disparity in educational attainments at primary level and its 
variations across households, focusing on households containing both sons and daughters. 
The study is based on two measures of gender discrimination – gap in mean educational 
score of siblings (D1) and difference in maximum educational score of siblings (D2). 
Contrary to the literature indicating the presence of a pro-son bias in case of parental 
investment on children, this study found a low incidence of gender bias in primary 
education. More than 70 per cent of the households in India educate sons and daughters 
equally. In the majority of households, there is no difference in maximum educational 
levels attained by children of either sex. Further, in about 10 per cent of households we 
found that parents educated daughters more than sons.  
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Analysis of the association between child sex ratio prevailing in the region and gender 
discrimination in education also reveals a surprising result. In regions having a  low child 
sex ratio – where we may infer sex selective abortion, infanticide and neglect of 
daughters in infancy is practiced – we find that discrimination is relatively lower than in 
regions where child sex ratio is high. This is observed in both rural and urban areas, and 
whether we consider gender gaps in mean score or maximum score. Controlling for 
social, economic and demographic factors the linear relation between child sex ratio and 
gender gap in mean score is replaced by a non-linear relationship. Regions with a low 
child sex ratio tend to treat sons and daughters equitably; regions with high child sex ratio 
are found to discriminate – but this may be either in favour of sons or in favour of 
daughters. In the case of gender gap in maximum educational score we find a tendency to 
favour daughters in regions with low child sex ratio.  
 
In other words, parents may adopt practices and behavioural patterns aimed to reduce the 
number of daughters. But once they pass early childhood, surviving girls are subject to 
lower levels of discrimination, at least in the education sphere: 
“women in Punjab are not treated very badly compared with the rest of India. 
Punjab has the highest female age at marriage next to Kerala. … Parents also 
make the sacrifices required to educate their daughters: levels of female literacy in 
Punjab are well above the India average and are increasing rapidly.” (Dasgupta, 
1987: 93). 
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Alam and Kingdon (2008) also reports that although girls are less likely to be enrolled in 
schools, expenditure on their education is at par with that of their siblings. The absence of 
disparity in educational outcomes also parallel studies of gender disparities in household 
expenditure on siblings using the Rothbart framework in South Asia (for review see 
Deaton, 1997). This implies that parental attitude towards education and practices may be 
more complicated and less uniformly negative at lower levels of education than 
commonly portrayed.9  
 
The findings may also be explained in terms of the demand and supply side measures to 
increase educational attainments and reduce gender gaps introduced by the Government. 
Schemes like the Mid Day Meal Scheme, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (literally ‘Campaign 
for Universal Education’), District Primary Education Program and National 
Programme for Education of Girls at Elementary Level Gender are designed to provide 
need-based incentives like residential schools for girls (Kasturba Gandhi Balika 
Vidyalaya), escorts, stationery, textbooks, uniforms, bicycles, in addition to creation of 
new infrastructure and improvement of existing facilities. This has reduced the gender 
gap in enrolment figures has reduced in recent years.10 A recent evaluation of supply side 
intervention in rural Rajasthan estimated that such measures increased enrollment ratios 
of girls by about 6-7 percentage points though the reduction in gender gap was lower (3-5 
percentage points, since some benefits were also shared by boys) (Meller, 2010). This 
                                               
9 Some studies have suggested that families with sons may increase labour supply (Lundberg and Rose, 
2002: Knight, 2010). This increases household resources, so that educational outcomes of girls with 
brothers are better than outcomes of girls with sisters (Chen et al., 2007). However, this does not explain 
why a greater part of the additional resources are not diverted to the son, but seem to be shared equally at 
the primary level. 
10 Mehta (2010) estimates that 69.46 million boys and 66.68 million girls were enrolled in Class I to V in 
2007-08; the Gender Parity Index was 0.93. 
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study, too, provides evidence of the success of government policies in reducing gender 
disparities.  
 
But, while the march towards universalizing enrolment and primary education is reducing 
gender disparity, other forms of disparities (across socio-religious communities) are 
persisting. Secondly, we also have to ensure that the reduction in gender disparity at the 
primary level does not taper off at higher levels of education. Our estimates from the NSS 
survey shows that if school education is considered, about a third of households treat sons 
and daughters equitably, while 45 per cent of families discriminate against girls. In rural 
areas, the latter figure increases to 49 per cent. This indicates the need to shift our focus 
to other forms of disparity and gender disparity at higher levels. 
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Table 1: Mean child sex ratio by discrimination pattern 
Measure India 
Favouring 
boys 
Equitable 
treatment 
Favouring 
girls 
Rural + Urban 931.11 919.1 925.06 
Rural 933.19 921.52 924.97 
Mean Score 
(D1) 
Urban 924.05 914.79 925.25 
Rural + Urban 930.41 919.98 926.65 
Rural 931.7 922.5 927.05 
Maximum 
Score (D2) 
Urban 925.65 915.36 925.82 
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Table 2: Results of Partial Proportional Odds Model – Mean score 
Pro-Girls vs Equal 
Treatment 
Pro Girls, Equal Treatment vs 
Pro Boys 
Disparity in Mean Educational 
Score (D1) 
Odds Ratio z P>z Odds Ratio z P>z 
Child Sex Ratio (0-6 years) 1.00 -2.22 0.03 1.00 3.51 0.00 
Per capita income 1.00 6.09 0.00 0.99 -2.54 0.01 
No. of children (11-18 years) 0.82 -9.07 0.00 1.19 8.51 0.00 
Urban (RC) 1.00     1.00     
Rural 1.27 4.29 0.00       
Muslim (RC) 1.00     1.00     
HUC 1.28 3.00 0.00 0.60 -6.73 0.00 
HST 1.23 2.63 0.01       
HSC 1.11 1.75 0.08       
HOBC 1.21 2.85 0.00 0.91 -1.60 0.11 
All Others 1.03 0.32 0.75 0.91 -0.91 0.36 
Female headed households (RC) 1.00     1.00     
Male headed households 1.07 0.79 0.43 0.29 0.40 0.00 
Central (RC) 1.00     1.00     
North 0.81 -2.87 0.00 0.81 -2.87 0.00 
South 1.66 5.05 0.00 0.48 -8.52 0.00 
East 1.04 0.40 0.69 0.83 -2.58 0.01 
West 1.69 4.10 0.00 0.68 -3.60 0.00 
North-east 0.71 -3.02 0.00 1.10 0.89 0.37 
Primary (RC) 1.00     1.00     
Illiterate 0.88 -2.02 0.04 1.31 5.34 0.00 
Literate 0.74 -2.53 0.01 1.32 2.84 0.01 
Secondary 1.26 3.11 0.00 0.59 -8.45 0.00 
HS & above 1.55 4.18 0.00 0.43 -9.19 0.00 
SE in agriculture (RC) 1.00     1.00     
SE in non-agriculture  1.03 0.63 0.53       
Ag labour  1.03 0.26 0.80 1.19 2.37 0.02 
Rural NF Labour  0.90 -1.02 0.31 1.14 1.63 0.10 
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Pro-Girls vs Equal 
Treatment 
Pro Girls, Equal Treatment vs 
Pro Boys 
Disparity in Mean Educational 
Score (D1) 
Odds Ratio z P>z Odds Ratio z P>z 
Other Rural Labour 0.88 -1.78 0.08       
Urban SE (RC) 1.00     1.00     
Wage & Salary Earner 0.98 -0.30 0.77       
Casual Urban Labour 0.93 -0.73 0.46       
Urban Labour 0.96 -0.29 0.77       
No. of schools / 000 persons 1.00 -1.47 0.14       
Percent of schools with girls toilet 1.00 -3.74 0.00 1.00 -0.87 0.39 
Percent of schools with female 
teachers 1.00 -3.00 0.00 1.00 -3.00 0.00 
Ratio of female-male wage 1.10 0.50 0.61 1.69 3.19 0.00 
Female Work Participation Rate 1.00 0.93 0.35       
Percent of females completing 
primary education 1.01 1.90 0.06 0.97 -11.67 0.00 
Intercept 2.64 6.33 0.00 -1.57 -4.53 0 
Model Statistics 
Observation 17866           
Wald Chi2 (52) 7008.3   0.00       
Pseudo R2 0.0938           
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Table 3: Results of Partial Proportional Odds Model – Maximum Score 
Pro-Girls vs Equal Treatment 
Pro Girls, Equal Treatment 
vs Pro Boys 
Disparity in Maximum 
Educational Score (D2) 
Odds Ratio z P>z Odds Ratio z P>z 
Child Sex Ratio (0-6 years) 1.00 -1.66 0.10 1.00 1.47 0.14 
Per capita income 1.0006 5.66 0.00 0.99 -7.32 0.00 
No. of children (11-18 years) 1.20 4.76 0.00 0.82 -6.64 0.00 
Urban (RC) 1.00     1.00     
Rural 1.33 4.55 0.00       
Muslim (RC) 1.00     1.00     
HUC 1.45 3.72 0.00 0.57 -6.49 0.00 
HST 1.47 2.91 0.00 1.06 0.59 0.56 
HSC 1.36 3.19 0.00 0.92 -1.06 0.29 
HOBC 1.33 3.39 0.00 0.87 -2.17 0.03 
All Others 1.12 0.89 0.38 0.89 -1.03 0.30 
Female headed households (RC) 1.00     1.00     
Male headed households 1.23 3.07 0.00       
Central (RC) 1.00     1.00     
North 0.87 -1.73 0.08       
South 1.63 4.38 0.00 0.53 -6.89 0.00 
East 0.90 -1.58 0.12       
West 1.60 3.20 0.00 0.69 -3.06 0.00 
North-east 0.63 -3.61 0.00 1.11 0.90 0.37 
Primary (RC) 1.00     1.00     
Illiterate 0.79 -3.25 0.00 1.41 6.08 0.00 
Literate 0.73 -2.22 0.03 1.40 3.17 0.00 
Secondary 1.25 2.52 0.01 0.58 -7.42 0.00 
HS & above 1.54 3.39 0.00 0.42 -7.83 0.00 
Self-Employed in agriculture 
(RC) 1.00     1.00     
Self-Employed in non-agriculture 0.98 -0.27 0.79       
Ag labour 1.10 1.34 0.18       
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Pro-Girls vs Equal Treatment 
Pro Girls, Equal Treatment 
vs Pro Boys 
Disparity in Maximum 
Educational Score (D2) 
Odds Ratio z P>z Odds Ratio z P>z 
Rural NF Labour 0.84 -1.53 0.13 1.14 1.57 0.12 
Other Rural Labour 0.91 -1.19 0.24       
Urban SE (RC) 1.00     1.00     
Wage & Salary Earner 0.96 -0.51 0.61       
Casual Urban Labour 0.97 -0.26 0.79       
Urban Labour 1.22 0.78 0.43 0.67 -1.50 0.13 
No. of schools / 000 persons 1.00 -2.25 0.03 1.00 0.04 0.97 
Percent of schools with girls 
toilet 1.00 -3.66 0.00 1.00 -0.27 0.79 
Percent of schools with female 
teachers 1.00 -2.18 0.03       
Ratio of female-male wage 0.93 -0.34 0.73 1.84 3.34 0.00 
Female Work Participation Rate 1.00 0.75 0.45       
Percent of females completing 
primary education 1.01 2.93 0.00 0.96 -12.23 0.00 
Intercept 1.72 3.52 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.94 
Model Statistics  
Observation 17866           
Wald Chi2 (52) 1804.71   0.00       
Pseudo R2 0.0928           
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Fig. 1: Percentage of families treating children 
equitably, against decile of child sex ratio - Mean 
score
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Fig. 2: Percentage of families favouring boys, 
against decile of child sex ratio - Mean score
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Fig. 3: Percentage of families treating children 
equitably, against decile of child sex ratio - 
Maximum score
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Fig. 4: Percentage of families favouring boys, 
against decile of child sex ratio - Maximum score
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Appendix Table A1: Socio-economic profile of sample households 
GEOGRAPHICAL HOUSEHOLD HEAD OF FAMILY 
Place of residence Socio Religious Community Gender of Decision-maker 
Rural 66.9 H-UC 19.71 Male 90.99 
Urban 33.1 H-ST 6.26 Female 9.01 
Geographical Zones H-SC 14.81 Education of Decision-maker 
North 12.7 H-OBC 30.27 Illiterate 32.09 
South 15.79 Muslims 16.15 Literate 3.58 
East 12.83 All Others 12.8 Up to Primary 25.25 
West 10.93 Expenditure Groups Up to Secondary 25.49 
North-East 12.19 BPL HHs 22.94 HS & above 13.59 
Central 35.56 DBPL HHs 52.95 Occupation 
Affluent HHs 24.11 
SE in non-
agriculture 15.51 
Ag Labour 8 
Other Rural Labour 6.53 
SE in Ag 26.99 
Urban SE 15.39 
Wage/Salary Earner 11.86 
Casual Urban 
Labour 4.18 
Urban Others 1.66 
    Rural Others 9.89 
 
